Myths about Borders and the Reconciliation Moment by Darko Gavrilović
suvremene TEME, (2010.) God. 3, Br. 1
CONTEMPORARY issues, (2010) Vol. 3, No. 1
centar za politološka istraživanja





Primljeno: 29. 9. 2010.




This article deals with the relevant historical and political myths, es-
pecially myths about borders, firstly regarding the nationalistic movements 
within the FPRY/SFRY (including political emigration myths), and the myths 
and counter-myths concerning the new states created in the 1990s. Method-
ologically, this article emphasizes the dynamics of these myths and observes 
them in their continuous interaction. Thus, as opposed to the architects and 
engineers of these myths who see these myths as “natural” and “eternal”, as 
well as freed from “artificial creation”, this article places the emphasis on the 
artificial, or constructed, character of myths about borders and states, both 
Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav, as well as on their changes, dynamics and inter-
action. The text covers the period from World War II until the present day. Also, 
article is seeking for the political solution how to deal with myths and placing 
it in political context of apology and reconciliation in the Former Yugoslav Ter-
ritories same as breaking the veil of secrecy in the Former Yugoslav Territories.
Key words: myths, borders, nationalism, communism, Yugoslavia, justice, rec-
onciliation, cross-border cooperation
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1.Borders and Nationalism
 After the end of the Cold War, and es-
pecially during the last fifteen years, the human 
need to right the immoral wrongs has been ex-
pressed in political discourse as a propensity 
to apologize for acts of past injustice. World 
morality, not say human nature, changed. Moral 
issues have become so powerful in the interna-
tional arena but, unfortunately, in the same are-
na, transition between 1989 and 1999 has been 
dramatic. It includes the horrendous wars in Yu-
goslavia and Africa, as well as the liberation of 
Eastern Europe and South Africa and the return 
to democracy in many Latin American countries. 
Even these beneficial changes from totalitar-
ian regimes or dictatorships have been a pain-
ful experience for many countries. In several of 
these transitions, instead of revenge against 
perpetrators, truth and reconciliation commit-
tees have tried to weigh culpability on pragmatic 
scales (Barkan, 2000: XVI).
 But before it happened, it is important 
to know that the wars in the former Yugoslavia 
were waged with the purpose of forming eth-
nic national states with ethnic national borders 
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which – as early as in the phase of ethnic nation-
alist movements, and later, following the consoli-
dation of the state – had imposed new myths, i.e. 
mutually conflicting versions of history, so that 
the new states be as different from each other as 
possible and new national identities be formed. 
The history of the peoples who once lived in the 
unified Yugoslav state has remained shared 
regardless of the fact that this state no lon-
ger exists but has given birth to several new 
states, with mostly same old socialist borders, but 
strongly shaped with national mythology, each 
of which has its own national history, interpret-
ing the same events, processes and problems in 
different ways. Nations and national states that 
sprouted from that multinational socialist fed-
eration (1945-1991), overthrown by ethnic na-
tionalist movements and the wars of the 1990s, 
remain unfinished national/nation-building prod-
ucts in the process of construction. At present, 
these are states in transition waiting to join the 
EU, and they face serious economic difficulties, 
as well as internal national consolidation prob-
lems, tense relations with their neighbors same 
as borders problems that ethnic nationalism tried 
to draw during the last two decades. By focusing 
on the situation in the former Yugoslavia twenty 
years after the crucial year of 1989, we can say 
that the borders partially helped in attention of 
the nationalists to answer the question of “who 
is who” in the region today, and partially not, be-
cause the hunger of different types of national-
ism never can be solved and always it is giving 
possibilities for opening the new appetites for the 
new territories.
 It is important to mention that all post-
Yugoslav states (including Slovenia, to a cer-
tain extent) define themselves primarily in relation 
to the past (Yugoslav states, wars of the 1940s 
and 1990s and pre-modern history), then in rela-
tion to one another and in relation to the leading 
Western countries. As states in transition, they are 
close to fitting into the concept of failed states, 
yet they made more progress when it comes 
to nation construction than the construction of 
statehood and the political/economic system. 
These nations have a “symbolic nationality” above 
all: a flag, national anthem, state religion, sport 
national teams, as well as collective fantasies 
about history, historical national borders and 
the present articulated as political myths and 
counter-myths. Wars might be waged again in 
the region because of the “symbolic-mythical 
nationalism” but I hope that a bigger conflict will 
not erupt because of transitional bankruptcy, the 
corrupt political elites and the influence of the lo-
cal mafia. For that reason, the analysis of the 
imaginary rather than the real, i.e. the political 
mythology of new nations, is the only way to an-
swer the question of who is who today in the for-
mer Yugoslavia. In this article it is impossible to 
present all the myths in the ex-Yugoslav region 
that are connected to borders. So, I decided to 
show some of the myths that are closely related 
with borders and who are, in the same time, are 
the important national myths that, during the last 
war helped to mobilized nationalism of the two 
biggest nations, Serbs and Croats.1 
1.1. Myths and Borders
 It is interesting how ambivalently the na-
tional community adheres to national territory, in 
the sense that this territory never has clearly-
defined contours and established borders. In 
modern Serbian folklore that sprouted during the 
wars of the 1990s, various landmarks were pro-
claimed as the borders of ethnic territory. In one 
case, the national territory extended from “Kar-
lovac to the plains of Kosovo”, while in another 
more humorous case, “Serbian land will extend 
from Oslo to Crete”. On the Croatian side, a band 
called Zlatni Dukati wrote nationally-engaged 
verses with a similar intonation:
“Between the Sava, Adriatic and the 
Drava
Always somewhere near a border
From ancient times lived
The Croats – men and women” 
(Čolović, 1996:280).
1 More about it in Perica, V. and Gavrilović, D., 2010. This 
collection of papers is a result of work carried out on a 
project that was jointly developed by a group of scientists 
from the territory of the former Yugoslavia under the aus-
pices of two non-governmental organizations for peace/
humanitarian activism – the Center for History, Democ-
racy and Reconciliation (CHDR) from Novi Sad, Serbia, 
and the Institute for Historical Justice and Reconcilia-
tion (IHJR) from Salzburg, Austria and The Hague, Neth-
erlands. The text was written in the form of a so-called 
“shared narrative”. This is a fairly new method which is 
most frequently used both in theory and in the practice 
of peaceful conflict resolution. The concept behind this 
method is that history be written without the imperative 
to reach a consensus regarding every controversy. Rath-
er, it is a joint study of history, with teamwork between 
the authors representing the sides in the conflict or post-
conflict phase, and the issuance of a joint publication and 
presentation that contribute to a peaceful resolution of 
the conflict.
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 This brings us to a group of myths about 
the special role of small Balkan peoples as the 
protectors of larger civilizations, for instance 
Christianity – both Western and Eastern – and so 
forth. These myths are linked to the myth about 
sacrifice made by a small people to fulfill the role 
of savior of a large civilization. For example, 
some of the Serbian myth-makers have gladly 
seen themselves as the “keepers of the gates 
to the civilized world” (Antemurale), taking par-
ticular pleasure in citing poems from the Kosovo 
cycle. For them, the Battle of Kosovo of 1389 
was a sacrifice made by the Serbian people for 
the benefit of the entire Christian civilization, as 
well as an example of how the same civilization 
never “repaid” this sacrifice, for it was the Serbs 
who – in spite of their defeat – weakened the 
Ottoman Army, thus rescuing Europe from an 
invasion from the East. According to this myth, 
the Serbs made a sacrifice for which they were 
never rightfully rewarded. Slobodan Milošević 
also called attention to this in his famous speech 
delivered in June 1989 at the celebration of the 
600-year anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 
Gazimestan. Due to this obvious lack of under-
standing for the “Serbian issue”, Serbs harbored 
a growing feeling of injustice and bitterness 
towards the West, while the nationalists once 
again found themselves inspired by topics from 
ancient history.
 Croatian nationalists, Milošević’s con-
temporaries, also focused on myths about bor-
ders and their role as gatekeepers of civilization. 
However, as opposed to Milošević, who did not 
continue where Serbian nationalists had left off 
at the end of World War II, the Croatian national-
istic establishment did begin at the point where 
their predecessors had left off in 1945. The ide-
ology promoted by Franjo Tuđman attempted to 
ensure continuity with the old forms of Croatian 
nationalism. 
 One of the maximalist forms of Croatian 
nationalism which is rooted in the Party of Rights 
ideology of Ante Starčević insists on the Drina 
River as the border. Ante Starčević believed the 
Croatian national territory to extend all the way 
to the Drina. This idea was later accepted by Stj-
epan Radić. However, as opposed to the later 
Ustasha ideology, Radić accepted religious, re-
gional and other forms of pluralism, while the 
Ustasha ideology insisted on a repressive role of 
the state that strives towards homogenization. In 
Croatian political circles, but also among Croats 
and Bosniaks in the 20th century, a thesis that 
would be very frequently put forth was that in the 
past there was a border on the Drina, that is to 
say, that on this river there used to be a centuries-
old – even thousand years old – border between 
the East and West, i.e. between the Catholic and 
Orthodox faiths. Though this mythologem seems 
old, it actually is not. It originated from the Pure 
Party of Rights, then found its way into the works 
of Milan Šufflaj in the 1990s and continued to 
develop abroad, among the Ustasha emigrants, 
in the 1950s. The mythologem about the “bor-
der on the Drina” is based on a myth maniacal 
use of the fact that following the death of Roman 
emperor Theodosius in 395 the Roman Empire 
was divided into the eastern and western parts, 
and that along one part the border followed 
the Drina valley all the way to the Montenegrin 
coastline. This historical fact is only relatively ac-
curate, because the divisions in terms of culture, 
civilization and society extended both east and 
west of the Drina. In order to establish the bor-
der on the Drina, the radically negative view of 
the Bosnian Muslims had to be altered, which 
is what Starčević did, and the Muslims became 
“the flower of the Croatian people”,2 while at the 
same time the Croats in Slavonia in the north 
were able to keep the myth about their land as a 
sort of Antemurale Christianitatis – “the bulwark 
of Christianity” (Goldstein, 2003: 111). Pro-Usta-
sha oriented intellectuals wrote about this myth, 
emphasizing the racial differences between the 
Croats and the Serbs. In his collection of essays, 
articles and speeches, Filip Lukas (geographer, 
geopolitician and president of Matica hrvatska 
for a number of years) presented a racial map 
of the Balkans. He concluded that Croats and 
Serbs represent opposite racial types but that 
the Montenegrins belong to the Croatian racial 
type. He agreed with the Iranian theory about the 
origin of the Croats, but his interpretation of it 
was particularly biased (Goldstein, 2003: 116).
 After World War II, during the “second 
emigration”3 of the Ustashas, the myth about the 
Drina transformed from the “gate of civilization” 
to a source of longing, nostalgia, resistance and 
the desire for revenge, to which numerous works 
of prose and poetry bore witness.
 It is important to mention that early me-
dieval history is extremely important for the fabri-
cated tradition in modern Serbian and Croat na-
tionalism. In the beginning of the 1990s, just prior 
to the breakup of Yugoslavia, writers appeared 
2 During the existance of the Independent State of Croatia, 
Mladen Lorković considered the entire Bosnia and Her-
zegovina to be Croatian land, while he considered the 
Bosnian Muslims to be Croats of an “Islamic faith”.
3 The first emigration took place during the time of the King-
dom of Yugoslavia.
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on the Serbian literary scene who expanded on 
the work and ideas of Serbian nationalistically-
oriented historians who wrote history textbooks 
in the second half of the 19th and beginning of 
the 20th century. At that time, Serbian creators of 
myths about the longevity of the Serbian people 
and size of the territories they occupied claimed 
that “all Slavs were once called Serbs, and only 
in the 6th century after Christ did they start calling 
them Slavs...”(Vukičević, 1904: 1). Some of their 
colleagues – geographers – saw the states of 
the neighboring peoples as exclusively Serbian 
and considered Dalmatia to be an exclusively 
Slavic country where “all the people of a Slavic 
origin – Orthodox and Catholic – are Serbs... 
Statistical information about Dalmatia and its 
population is not stated in historical textbooks. All 
that was written in them was that the first Serbian 
settlements in Dalmatia extended all the way to 
the Cetina River. This is why the islands of Brač, 
Hvar, Korčula and Mljet were identified as Ser-
bian“ (Jelavich, 1992: 182), while Serbian lands 
stretched further, from „the Drava and Tamiš and 
to the south over the Sava and Danube, reaching 
the Thessaloniki Plain, as well as Mount Olym-
pus and Pindus, the city of Durrës in present-day 
Albania; in the west, the border of the Serbian fa-
therland extended to the Una River, the Cetina 
River and the Adriatic Sea, and in the east past 
the middle region and the Rhodope Mountains...“ 
(Vukičević, 1904: 28,30-31). Following the exam-
ple of their colleagues from the end of the 19th 
and the beginning of the 20th century, the Ser-
bian myth-bearers of today have readily placed 
their fountain pens in the service of the national 
idea and continued to spread the myth about the 
“chosen people”. The work of these writers – 
among them Borislav Vlajić-Zemljanički, Jovan 
I. Deretić, Dobroslav Jevđević, Olga Luković-
Pjanović and Draško Šćekić – was also sup-
ported by painters such as Milić Stanković and 
Dragoš Kalajić. They all shared one idea, which 
is that Serbs are the oldest people in the world. 
During the time of difficult Presidency sessions, 
when suspicions were first voiced in public that 
the state would disintegrate in the vortex of war, 
such statements made by writers – probably ac-
cording to the creators of national policy – were 
intended to have a beneficial and mobilizing ef-
fect on the national consciousness of the Serbi-
an people. Their works soon reached the public, 
and among those that attracted the most atten-
tion was the book by Olga Luković-Pjanović titled 
“Serbs ... the Oldest People”, published in 1990. 
Through the work of this author, the long-familiar 
and ideologically well thought-out way to prove 
the greatness and age of this (chosen) people by 
means of language and its link to toponyms, had 
found a simple path to the readers with the inten-
tion of awakening their national self-awareness in 
the ideological sense.  This is profoundly contra-
dictory to Croatian myths about the oldest na-
tional states, which insist on seniority, especially 
in comparison to the Serbs, thus mythologizing 
the Croatian state and its rulers who governed 
at least 300 years before the Serbian state that 
was created in the 13th century. 
1.2. Promised Land
 Intertwined with the myths about borders 
are elements of the archetypal myth about the 
Promised Land. For example, in his 1994 book 
titled “Sorabi: istoriopis”, referring to the words 
of Sima Lukin Lazić, Draško Šćekić claims that 
the First Migration of the Serbs and their disper-
sion began about 4500 years before the birth of 
Christ (Radić, 2003: 38,39). Moreover, on page 
72 of his book it is stated: “In India, the first 
cradle of the Sorbs or Serbs, where as early as 
5000 years before the birth of Christ two Serbian 
states existed: the great Sarbar state, in the Gan-
getic region, and the coastal Panovska state...”, 
4based on which it turns out that the Serbs are 
such an old people that, when compared with 
the Old Testament, they are older than Adam 
and that, since the author himself stated that 
the world was created exactly at 9 o’clock a.m. 
on 23 October 4004 BC, they are older than the 
world itself. Therefore, if we were to follow this 
train of thought, it turns out that first the Serbs 
existed, and only then did God create the world 
4 Jovan I. Deretić also wrote about the ancient history of 
the Serbs, emphasizing that ancient Serbia extended 
across the Adriatic peninsula several centuries before 
the Roman conquest. Its capital was Sarda, present-day 
Shkoder. Other than this Serbia, there was another Ser-
bia in Dacia, and yet another in the north on the Sarma-
tian Sea, which is today called the Baltic Sea.
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(Radić, 2007:124.)!5 Of course, there were many 
similar writers who were receiving the greatest 
coverage in the media as theirs beliefs suited 
the propaganda activities of Milošević’s regime – 
which had to instill the feeling of uniqueness and 
greatness among the Serbian people in order to 
prevent personal political failure.
 Certain Croatian scientists considered 
the ancient inhabitants of Iran to be the ances-
tors of the Croats, whereas others considered 
them to be the Ostrogoths – an idea that was 
particularly popular during World War II, with the 
aim of pointing out that Croats are not Slavs. 
Prior to the appearance of authors who served 
the Ustasha propaganda with the intention of 
separating the Croats from the Slavic group of 
people by coming up with fanciful ideas about 
the origin of the Croats, there were quite a few 
of those whose vision of the greatness of their 
people and their borders was – similarly to their 
Serbian colleagues from the beginning of the 20th 
century – far removed from reality. For example, 
Vjekoslav Klaić, whose specialty was the Middle 
Ages, wrote about the existence of a “Great or 
White Croatia, from which Slavic tribes and peo-
ples emigrated in all directions” (Jelavich, 1992: 
210). This was an assertion somewhat similar 
to the one made by the Serbs. According to this 
Croatian author, all Slavs were once Croats. The 
lands inhabited by the Croats matched the de-
scriptions of Serbian lands. As Srkulj had stated, 
“the land where the Croats settled ex-
tended from the Adriatic Sea and Raša 
in Istria all the way to Bosnia in the east, 
and from the Danube in the north to the 
Bojana River in the south. Chronicler 
Priest Dukljanin calls the land which at 
first extended from Cetina to the Zrman-
5 Such a mythological notion fostered Serbian nationalism 
during the 1990s. Nevertheless, it very quickly found it-
self in opposition to another mythological notion – that 
of the Russians, the friendly and brotherly nation of the 
Serbs. At the time the Russians also harbored the myth 
about being the oldest people in the world, and its loud-
est proponent was Y. P. Mirolyubov. The already pub-
lished “Book of Veles”, which he persistently adhered to 
as the book about the creation of the world, spread the 
dream about the Slavic Russians being the oldest peo-
ple on earth, that their original homeland is located be-
tween Sumer, Iran and North India, from which they had 
migrated approximately five thousand years ago, broke 
through to Iran, crushed despotic rule in Mesopotamia 
with their cavalry, conquered Syria and Palestine, invad-
ed Egypt, and reached Europe in the 8th century BC. I 
think that the followers of Y. P. Mirolyubov should come 
face to face with the followers of Olga Luković Pjanović 
for an endless discussion in a “brotherly Serbian-Russian 
embrace”, during which they can express their arguments 
regarding which people are the oldest in the world.
ja river, and then to Raša in Istria – the 
old Liburnia – White Croatia, whereas 
the region between the Cetina and Bo-
jana rivers he calls Red Croatia... Croats 
also inhabited Southern Panonia, the 
land from the Drava and Danube rivers 
all the way to Kapela and Gvozd to the 
south and southwest“ (Srkulj, 1912:58).
 The tendency to reach so far back into 
the past continued during the 1990s, and the 
creation of geographical and historical maps 
with state or national borders had largely aided 
the creators of the wars in the former Yugoslavia 
to convince the population of the ethical value 
of their deeds. Particularly imaginative was Mate 
Marčinko, who decided to convince the Croatian 
people of their multi-millennial existence as an 
ancient Indo-European people, while the borders 
held by the Croats, according to him and those 
with similar beliefs were far wider than they are 
today. 
 In this context, a significant role was played 
by newspaper series, feuilleton-type articles 
– in rare cases signed by historians but much 
more frequently by history enthusiasts. Histo-
rians usually do not hold monopoly over their 
profession in the media; it is the history enthu-
siasts, with their simplification of the past, who 
dominate, and it is they who are the creators of 
historical culture.
2. The Reconciliation Moment
 After the end of the Cold War, and espe-
cially during the last fifteen years, the human 
need to amend immoral wrongs has been ex-
pressed in political discourse as a propensity 
to apologize for acts of past injustice. A wave of 
apology continues to work its way through global 
politics. In September 2003, the presidents of 
Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro unexpect-
edly exchanged apologies for “all of the evils” perpe-
trated by their countries. Nicholas Tavuchis was 
among the first scholars to take up the subject 
of these political apologies, and his text: “Mea 
Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconcilia-
tion” still serves as a historical starting point for 
the field. Tavuchis regarded apology as one of 
the „deep truths” of social life and as a „moral ex-
pedition“ which could repair damaged social re-
lations and allow the parties of past injustices to 
go on with their lives (Barkan and Karn, 2006: 5). 
From Argentina, to South Africa, to ex-Yugoslav 
countries, to the United States – societies and 
international institutions are deciding how they 
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should reckon with past and atrocities (including 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against hu-
manity, rape and torture) that may have been 
committed by a government against its own citi-
zens, by its opponents, or by combatants in an 
international armed conflict.
 One of the possible ways to deal with the 
past injustices and to preventing genocide is to 
research the past, which is shroud with political 
myths, without bias and prejudice. This is im-
possible, even as a first step if we are, at the first 
level, faced with ideologically controlled society 
and closed archives with valuable documents 
that can shed light into our past. And on the sec-
ond level, if we are faced with myths that are 
building blocks of nations (only no national his-
tory is myth-free). Due to all this, both the inten-
tional and non-intentional cover-ups of the his-
toric truth about the causes of conflicts among 
South Slavs only prolong the existing conflicts 
and bring about new conflicts with even more 
perilous consequences. (Kožar, 2005: 182)
 According to that, on the other side, if 
we are faced with these cover-ups and new 
myth-making that ruined our lives in last two de-
cades and if we still want to make steps forward 
to do away with nationalism and try to create civil 
society, and face the past through documents as 
historians are doing, it is imperative for all of us 
from ex-Yugoslav territories to work on apolo-
gies and reconciliation as the important step to-
ward preventing genocide. That process is going 
in four phases.
2.1. Group Apology
 Group apology is first step, and it repre-
sents a new and compelling iteration of our com-
mitment to moral practice. Despite new tensions 
and escalating hostilities associated with what 
some view as the new world disorder, apology 
remains a powerful trend in global politics. Even 
as cycles of violence emerge in some spots, in 
others, we see rival groups (like in ex-Yugoslav 
countries) willing to put their troubled histories in 
the service of justice and peace. 
 In the best cases, the negotiation of apol-
ogy works to promote dialogue, tolerance, and 
cooperation between groups knitted together un-
comfortably (or ripped asunder) by some past in-
justice. A sincere expression of remorse, offered 
at the right pitch and tenor, can pave the way for 
atonement and reconciliation by promoting mu-
tual understanding and by highlighting the possi-
bilities for peaceful coexistence. Practiced within 
its limits, apology can create a new framework in 
which groups may rehearse their past(s) and re-
consider the present. By approaching their griev-
ances through a discourse of repentance and 
forgiveness, rivals can explore the roots and leg-
acies of historical conflict as a first step toward 
dampening the discord and frictions that they 
produced. It is possible, of course, to overstate 
the effectiveness of apology, but the psychologi-
cal attraction it has for perpetrators, victims, and 
those who live in the shadow of historical injus-
tice seems empirically undeniable. Especially 
at the group level, apology has emerged as a 
powerful negotiating tool for nations and states 
eager to defuse tensions stemming from past 
injustices (Barkan and Karn, 2006: 7). It is im-
portant to mentioned, that apology and dialogue, 
in general, are only the first step in the longer 
process of post-conflict reconciliation. Reconcili-
ation requires the sides of the conflict to accept 
their own past first and only then to reach an un-
derstanding of the shared past.
2.2. Trials and Truth Commissions
 If the apology is the first way of how to 
resolve the clashes and national tensions, the 
second consists of trials and truth commissions 
that can work cooperatively, each responsible 
for emphasizing one of the two ideals – punish-
ment and reconciliation – but not completely ig-
noring the other. It is better if neither tool is over-
loaded with functions that the other can perform 
better. For example, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has indicted, 
has put on trial, and is punishing some middle-
level implementers, some high military com-
manders, former presidents, and other alleged 
planners of atrocities in Bosnia. In contrast, a 
proposed truth and reconciliation commission, 
comprised of representatives of the Serb, Croat, 
and Muslim communities, could investigate and 
deliberate together concerning the truth about 
past. This kind of investigation and a resultant 
authorized report would partially settle accounts 
with the great number of rank-and-file rights vio-
lators. Such a report would also go beyond the 
scope of judicial processes – recognize and ap-
plaud those from all sides who found ways to aid 
their ethnically diverse and endangered neigh-
bors.
 The relations of trials and truth commis-
sions can be complementary in a stronger sense, 
because each body may enhance as well as 
supplement the other. Fair trials and punish-
ment may contribute to the reconciliation and 
truth sought by truth commissions. On the one 
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hand, if victims believe that their testimony might 
be used by national or international tribunals to 
bring perpetrators to justice; this knowledge can 
also satisfy the thirst for justice and lead to heal-
ing. On the other hand, the evidence that truth 
commissions unearth may have a positive role 
to play in judicial proceedings. Moreover, truth 
commissions, after evaluating the fairness and 
independence of a country’s judicial system, 
might recommend judicial reform or argue that 
an international tribunal should have jurisdiction 
(Crocker, 2006: 73-74).
2.3. Scholar Projects and Meetings
 The third step towards reconciliation is 
support of scholar projects and meetings that 
seek to promote (among students, teachers and 
pupils through journals, textbooks and semi-
nars, same as in society especially through the 
documentary movies) a dynamic, multinational, 
multiethnic and non-partisan history. Its aim is to 
foster understanding and acceptance of ethnic 
and national differences, highlight similarities 
in cultural, religious, social and political life and 
harmonize the various histories that exist in the 
region. This projects have to engage scholars, 
educators, media representatives and civil so-
ciety organizations in process to transform “the 
image of the enemy“ and examine the historical 
myths that have been used as propaganda from 
different ethnic perspectives. This process includes 
working with teams built from the different re-
gions with goal of researching, writing and dis-
seminating shared historical narratives in an ef-
fort to build greater understanding of „the other“ 
and thereby contributing toward the dispelling of 
public myths often used to conflagrate tensions. 
 Alongside this, it is necessary to incor-
porate in such projects and meeting those political 
elites (creating in the region the groups of friend-
ship among those political groups of different na-
tions who wants to promoting peaceful relations 
and reconciliation as possible way for preventing 
genocide) who wants reconciliation in the region. 
Politicians should be invited to discuss future co 
operations with scholars on reconciliation pro-
cesses and regional stability. These meetings 
should generally raise public awareness through 
online and print media. So, that can be the third 
step toward reverting genocide, post-conflict 
reconciliation, fostering of democratic values 
and peace building in regions afflicted by lega-
cies of ethnic and religious conflict.   
 For example, in the ex Yugoslav region, 
that kind of project seeks to identify the following 
relevant political and national myths, looking at 
their mutual “dynamic interaction” during the pe-
riod of the old regime, antebellum crisis, wartime 
and postwar transition: first, official myths of Tito-
ism as well as alternative myths emerging dur-
ing the socialist era; second, Serbian, Croatian, 
Bosnian, Montenegrin and Albanian old and new 
ethnic myths, third, the religious myths incorpo-
rated into the new national ideologies and fourth, 
myths about the wars of the 1990s and at the 
end to work with Group of friendship among Bos-
nian, Croat and Serbian parliaments in attention 
to find a way for preventing genocide. Also, the 
wish of the group of scholars who are working 
on that project is to emphasize the process and 
its dynamics because the nations under consid-
eration are incomplete. In other words, no nation 
that came out of ex-Yugoslavia (not even Ser-
bia, Croatia and Slovenia, not to mention Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Kosovo or Macedonia) is 
a finished product. All of them are in a rather raw 
shape let alone the feared possibility of further 
bifurcation and emergence of new nations-state 
lets. 
2.4. Cross-Border Cooperation
 Borders are the “scars of history”. The 
wide range of problems and opportunities on both 
sides of borders in wider Europe makes cross-
border cooperation indispensable. The border 
areas of the countries of Western Europe took 
the first steps towards organized cooperation al-
ready in 1950s where the state borders did not 
correspond to natural linguistic, ethnic, cultural 
or economic communities. At first it was done 
spontaneously, with bottom-up cooperation sys-
tem evolving that lacking any formality. Later, 
principles and legal regulations influenced al-
ready functioning practice, mainly supported by 
the Council of Europe, the European Union and 
the Association of European Border Regions, 
and then slowly evolving into appropriate institu-
tional structures. This tendency was enhanced 
by regional policies in the Union, the beginning 
of the INTER-REG program via which coopera-
tion along the internal and external borders of 
the European Union was aided. So, at third level 
is cross-border cooperation (CBC) between the 
states in the divided region. It is the perspective 
of reinforcing cooperation with countries border-
ing the European Union, the European Neigh-
borhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) that 
includes a component specifically targeted on 
that point. The CBC strategy has four key objec-
tives:
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• Promote economic and social develop-
ment in border areas
• Address common challenges
• Ensure efficient and secure borders
• Promote people-to-people cooperation
Two types of programs have been established:
• Land border program between two or 
more countries sharing a common bor-
der (or short sea crossing).
• Multilateral program covering a sea ba-
sin.
 It is the task of the regional and local part-
ners on both sides of the border to analyze their 
common needs and to identify priorities and ac-
tions that are most relevant to their local situa-
tion. CBC uses an approach largely modeled 
on ‘Structural Funds’ principles such as multian-
nual programming, partnership and co-financing, 
adapted to take into account the specificities of 
the EC’s external relations rules and regulation. 
But, also, CBC is a way to healing the trauma 
from the certain past.
2.5. Forgiveness
 At the end comes forgiveness. It is a Chris-
tian morality, or rather its secular embodiment, 
which have raised forgiveness to the status of 
supreme, even constitutive value. Not only has 
Christianity emphasized internal transformative 
capacities, but it has also put suffering and its re-
demption at the core. The best that can be done 
in these circumstances is to implement legal jus-
tice, even though both are very much aware that 
justice cannot be done anymore. Jankelevitch 
wrote his essay in the midst of the French debate 
regarding the indescribability of Nazi crimes. For 
him, pardon is equal to forgetting crimes against 
Jews and true crimes against humanity, against 
the human essence. They cannot be pardoned. 
He also does not believe in German repentance: 
„German Repentance, it’s name is Stalingrad ... 
it’s name is defeat.“ (Jankelevitch, 1996: 552-
572) For all these reasons, it may have nothing 
to do with the term reconciliation as we use it to-
day, which is understood entirely in a social and 
political perspective that is completely indepen-
dent of personal feelings. No one expects the 
victims to forgive anyone, but the social process 
of receiving restitution and processes of political 
forgiveness can still legitimately be considered 
part of a reconciliation process. At the end, it is 
important to conclude that despite its Christian 
origins and western dominance, it would be er-
roneous to conceive of these developments as a 
new form of “moral imperialism“. 
3. Conclusion
 Europe is on the right track to round its 
Balkan and eastern boundaries and finally be-
come one “community”, but this community will 
comprise of historically aware nations and their 
states. There is no nation in the early 21st century 
Europe that has discarded its history as some 
kind of old coat which is no longer fashionable. 
Accordingly, the Serbs should do it neither; nev-
ertheless, they should neither use it so bluntly 
for spreading nationalism. The worst thing that 
historians can do is put their knowledge in the 
service of ideology and attempt at validating an 
opinion formed in advance by distortion and the 
blunt exploitation of documents which support 
the formation of the myths of nationalism. The 
Serbs must be able to take the cultural treasure 
they have accumulated into the 21st century. Yet, 
to move into the future with a continual projec-
tion of cultural treasures into political myths of 
nationalism, a distortion of historical truths, and 
taking for granted historical half-truths and lies 
will not be a locomotive on the Serbian road 
to Europe but deadwood sitting heavily on its 
shoulders.
 Nevertheless, this much should be ad-
mitted - not all people can live without myths. 
They are still needed for the majority of people, 
since, as emphasized by Christian von Krockow 
“it is not only what the reason tells that matters to 
people and nations, but also what speaks to their 
feelings, their hearts”. This means not that this is 
the reason to allow nationalism to influence, or 
worse still, to build a society which will be based 
on them. Should we agree with both Strauss and 
Krockow and include the “tragic” into the future, 
which will take us back to the myths of national-
ism, because, according to him, “it is only pos-
sible to explain why the definition of the national 
entity has to be fulfilled in the tragic and existen-
tial differentiating, in a delimitation in regard to 
the other and foreign from the aspect of an en-
emy”. Or, a different road should be chosen, the 
road of life in freedom which requires no myth 
but only defense when this freedom is endan-
gered together with the promise of humanity and 
happiness founded on it. 
 I am of the opinion that a new pragmat-
ics should take the place of nationalism, the one 
which is capable of serving as a basis of legitimi-
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zation of modern states. It is a democratic con-
stitutional state, a legal state, a social state and 
a state with an environmentally restrained eco-
nomic growth. It would be some kind of combina-
tion of the reaches the civilization has achieved 
since the 18th century in regard to political-his-
torical “dual revolution” of the West, but it would 
also be a result of all the traditional aspirations 
which endangered the prevailing type of state in 
the countries of the West after World War II. The 
longer peace is maintained and this pragmat-
ics confirmed as valid, the more nationalism will 
lose its social-integrative and political-legitimate 
forces. The weaker it gets, breaking its myths 
against the cliffs of sober and unbiased scientific 
approach, the chances for an honest, not just 
declarative, peace will increase in the territory of 
former Yugoslavia. In such a case, nationalism 
would be able to reach its decline, and the myths 
created within the cultural heritage of nations 
would remain unexploited by ideology, yet a sub-
ject of cultural history research, which would al-
low scientists to create more complete and politi-
cally unbiased images of their own pasts.
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Mitovi o granicama i trenutak pomirbe
DARKO GAVRILOVIĆ
Sveučilište Singidinum, Srbija
Ovaj članak bavi se relevantnim povijesnim i političkim mitovima, pose-
bice mitovima o granicima, u prvoj liniji s nacionalističkim pokretima u FNRJ/
SFRJ (uključujući mitove političke emigracije), kao i s mitovima i protumitovi-
ma stvorenima u novim državama tijekom 1990tih. Metodološki, ovaj rad 
naglašava dinamiku tih mitova i promatra ih u njihovoj stalnoj interakciji. Prema 
tome, suprotno arhitektima i inženjerima takvih mitova koji ih vide kao “prirodne” 
i “vječne” te slobodne od “umjetnog stvaranja”, ovaj članak stavlja naglasak 
na umjetni, odnosno konstruirani karakter mitova o granicama i državama, 
kako jugoslavenskim, tako postjugoslavenskim te prikazuje njihove promjene, 
dinamiku i interakciju. Tekst pokriva razdoblje od Drugog svjetskog rata do 
danas. Također, članak traži političko rješenje suočavanja s mitovima i njiho-
vog stavljanja u politički kontekst isprike i pomirbe na bivškim jugoslavenskim 
prostorima i razdiranje vela tajnovitosti u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. 
Ključne riječi: mitovi, granice, nacionalizam, komunizam, Jugoslavija, pravda, 
pomirba, prekogranična suradnja
Darko Gavrilović: Myths about Borders and the Reconciliation Moment
